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INTRODUCTION
Ten years ago, Justice Blackmun threw in the towel and concluded that
states could not impose the death penalty in accordance with the
Constitution.1 The Supreme Court has, however, refused to follow his lead
and has issued numerous decisions in an effort to make the ultimate
punishment conform to the constitutional requirements2 enumerated in
1. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). (“From
this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death. For more than 20
years I have endeavored—indeed, I have struggled—along with a majority of this Court, to
develop procedural and substantive rules that would lend more than the mere appearance of
fairness to the death penalty endeavor. Rather than continue to coddle the Court’s delusion
that the desired level of fairness has been achieved and the need for regulation eviscerated, I
feel morally and intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death penalty experiment
has failed. It is virtually self-evident to me now that no combination of procedural rules or
substantive regulations ever can save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional
deficiencies.”).
2. See, e.g., Schiro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2523 (2004) (declining to apply
retroactively Ring v. Arizona’s requirement that a jury find aggravating factors before the
state imposes the death penalty); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 535-38 (2003) (discussing
ineffectiveness of counsel in the investigation and presentation of mitigating factors);
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 342-46 (2003) (disavowing racial discrimination in
peremptory challenges during jury voir dire); Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 51
(2001) (requiring trial courts to inform juries that life in prison without the possibility of
parole is an alternative to consider when evaluating an offender’s future dangerousness);
Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88, 90-91 (1998) (refusing to require trial courts to inform
juries of lesser offenses during capital cases where those offenses “are not lesser included
offenses of the charged crime”); Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 279 (1998) (failing
to identify any constitutional basis for a jury instruction on the meaning of mitigation and its
role in the capital sentencing process); Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515 (1995)
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Furman v. Georgia3 and Lockett v. Ohio.4 With its 2002 decision in Atkins
v. Virginia,5 the Supreme Court added mentally retarded offenders to the
growing list of persons categorically excluded from receiving the death
penalty.6 The Atkins Court provided limited guidance for implementing its
decision and left the states with the onerous burden of determining which
offenders they can execute.7
This Comment argues that the Constitution requires the government to
prove the absence8 of mental retardation to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt before imposing a death sentence. Part I briefly discusses the
Supreme Court’s capital punishment jurisprudence with a focus on the
constitutional requirements and the development of the mental retardation
exclusion. Part II argues that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ring v.
Arizona9 and Apprendi v. New Jersey10 provide a Sixth Amendment basis
for jury determination of mental retardation. Part II also examines an
independent Eighth Amendment justification for requiring the state to
prove the absence of mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt.
Finally, Part II explores an offender’s due process right to a jury
determination of mental retardation and concludes that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires the prosecution to bear the burden of proof by at least
a probable cause standard. Part III discusses how states can comply with
the Constitution by implementing procedures to prevent the execution of
mentally retarded offenders. It also suggests that a pretrial determination
of mental retardation is the most efficient way to implement Atkins while
simultaneously preserving an offender’s due process rights.
(allowing a judge to override a jury’s advisory sentencing verdict and impose the death
penalty).
3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (plurality opinion) (requiring states to impose the death penalty
fairly or not at all).
4. 438 U.S. 586, 605-06 (1978) (mandating the consideration of all aspects of an
offender’s character, record, and the circumstances of the offense during capital sentencing).
5. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (noting that the Constitution places a substantive
restriction on a state’s power to take the life of a mentally retarded offender).
6. See Roper v. Simmons, No. 03-633, slip op. at 14 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2005) (excluding
juveniles under eighteen from capital punishment); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,
838 (1988) (excluding juveniles under sixteen from capital punishment); Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) (excluding the insane from the death penalty).
7. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317; see also Ford, 477 U.S. at 416-17 (“[W]e leave to the State
the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon its
execution of sentences.”).
8. Requiring the prosecution to prove a negative, such as proving the absence of selfdefense or heat of passion/provocation beyond a reasonable doubt, poses no constitutional
infirmity and is not unique in the American system of criminal justice. See Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701-02 (1975).
9. 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (overruling prior case law and holding that a defendant has the
right to have a jury decide the existence of aggravating factors necessary to impose the
death penalty).
10. 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (requiring that the government prove any fact that would
increase a defendant’s sentence to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt).

BRAUERMAN.OFFTOPRINTER

404

8/9/2005 1:03:15 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
I.

[Vol. 54:401

BACKGROUND

A. Establishing the Minimum Requirements for a Constitutional
Death Penalty
In 1972, the Supreme Court took the first step in its torturous journey to
conform the procedural and substantive elements of the death penalty to the
requirements of the Constitution.11 In Furman, the Court held that the
death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual
punishment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.12
Citing the infrequent, random, discriminatory, excessive, and arbitrary
manner in which states imposed the death penalty, a five Justice plurality
suspended executions in the United States.13
In their concurring opinions, Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall
analyzed the cruel and unusual nature of the death penalty by “the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”14
Although only three Justices specifically relied on it, the “evolving
standards of decency” became the primary analytical tool15 for defining
“cruel and unusual” punishment and for identifying penalties that violate
the Eighth Amendment.16
11. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (plurality opinion) (identifying the
constitutional infirmities in the application of the death penalty).
12. Id. at 241-45 (arguing that the history of the Eighth Amendment demonstrates that
cruel and unusual punishment includes the death penalty, especially where the penalty is
applied selectively to a specified group of people, such as a racial minority).
13. See id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring) (denouncing the discriminatory imposition
of the death penalty); id. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“It is a denial of human dignity
for the State arbitrarily to subject a person to an unusually severe punishment that society
has indicated it does not regard as acceptable, and that cannot be shown to serve any penal
purpose more effectively than a significantly less drastic punishment.”); id. at 310 (Stewart,
J., concurring) (“[The Constitution] cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death
under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly
imposed.”); id. at 311-12 (White, J., concurring) (observing that the infrequent imposition of
the death penalty makes it impossible for the death penalty to serve any legitimate
penological purpose); id. at 332-33 (Marshall, J., concurring) (condemning capital
punishment as excessive, unnecessary, and abhorrent to currently existing moral values).
But see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (cautioning that courts should not
interpret Furman as holding the death penalty unconstitutional per se).
14. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring), id. at 269-70 (Brennan, J.,
concurring), id. at 327, 329 (Marshall, J., concurring) (all quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958)).
15. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (assessing evolving standards to
determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual); see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 311-12 (2002) (relying on evolving societal standards when determining whether a
particular punishment violates the Eighth Amendment); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
361, 369 (1989) (placing the burden of proof on defendants to establish that their
punishment violates society’s evolving moral standards); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
330-31 (1989) (applying evolving standards analysis to determine the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment).
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
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The Furman moratorium lasted four years until the Court decided Gregg
v. Georgia17 and held that states can impose the death penalty provided
they properly guide sentencing discretion to prevent the arbitrary and
discriminatory imposition of the penalty that the Court found problematic
in Furman.18 In Furman, Gregg, and the cases that followed, the Supreme
Court established the minimum requirements for a constitutional death
penalty.19 While the Constitution does not require states to adopt a capital
punishment system, those that do must impose the death penalty in
accordance with the Constitution’s requirements.20
B. Mental Retardation and the “Evolving Standards of Decency”
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of executing
mentally retarded offenders in Penry v. Lynaugh.21 After a trial22 during
which the defense challenged Penry’s competence and sanity,23 the jury
convicted him and sentenced him to death.24 In her majority opinion,
Justice O’Connor wrote:
I cannot conclude that all mentally retarded people of Penry’s ability—
by virtue of their mental retardation alone, and apart from any
individualized consideration of their personal responsibility—inevitably
lack the cognitive, volitional, and moral capacity to act with the degree
of culpability associated with the death penalty.25

The Court would not find evidence of a national consensus prohibiting the

17. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
18. Id. at 187 (requiring that states guide a sentencing body’s discretion in imposing the
death penalty in order to stay within the boundaries of the Constitution).
19. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (commanding that a jury find the
aggravating factors necessary for the state to impose a death sentence); McClesky v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 293-95 (1987) (rejecting the use of general statistics as proof of racial
discrimination when challenging a death sentence); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
110 (1982), Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (insisting on individualized
consideration of mitigating factors in capital sentencing); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
600 (1977) (requiring proportionality between a death sentence and the crime it punishes);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (enjoining racial, sexual, or social
discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 304-05 (1976) (rejecting mandatory death sentences); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972) (plurality opinion) (prohibiting the arbitrary and capricious application of the death
penalty).
20. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169.
21. 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (declining to adopt a rule banning the execution of
mentally retarded offenders).
22. Id. at 307 (describing how Penry killed Pamela Carpenter by stabbing her with
scissors after raping and beating her).
23. Id. at 308-10 (characterizing Penry as having an intelligence quotient (“IQ”)
between fifty and sixty-three, which indicated mild to moderate mental retardation, the
mental age of a six-and-a-half-year-old, and the social maturity of a nine to ten-year-old, all
caused by beatings and neurological injuries suffered as a child).
24. Id. at 311.
25. Id. at 338.
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execution of mentally retarded offenders for another thirteen years.26
In 2002, the Supreme Court reexamined the evidence of a national
consensus and concluded that the execution of mentally retarded offenders
did constitute cruel and unusual punishment.27 Following his conviction
and death sentence28 based largely on the testimony of his accomplice,29
Atkins appealed to the Supreme Court.30 Writing for the majority, Justice
Stevens identified a national consensus and concluded that the execution of
mentally retarded offenders violates the Eighth Amendment.31
Since Penry, sixteen states had changed their death penalty statutes to
exempt mentally retarded offenders from capital punishment,32 and two
others had begun that process.33 As Justice Stevens explained: “It is not so
much the number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of
the direction of change.”34 In making its decision, the Court also
considered subjective indicators of a national consensus, including public
opinion polls and international opposition, in addition to the objective
measures of jury behavior and legislative enactments the Court relied upon
in Penry.35
26. Compare id. at 334-35 (refusing to recognize a national consensus where only two
state statutes prohibited the execution of mentally retarded offenders, even when added to
the fourteen states that did not impose the death penalty at all), with Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 315 (2002) (recognizing a national consensus where thirty states either explicitly
prohibited the execution of mentally retarded offenders or the death penalty entirely).
27. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304-05.
28. Id. at 308 (imposing the death sentence because of the manner in which Atkins
kidnapped, robbed, and murdered Eric Nesbit).
29. Id. at 307-08 (observing that Atkins’ cohort, William Jones, did not suffer from
mental retardation and the jury found his testimony more credible and coherent than
Atkins’).
30. Atkins v. Virginia, 533 U.S. 976 (2001) (granting certiorari); see Atkins, 536 U.S. at
308-09 (restating the opinion of a forensic psychologist who concluded that Atkins was
mildly mentally retarded with an IQ of fifty-nine and a mental age between nine and
twelve).
31. Id. at 321.
32. Id. at 314-15 (citing the statutes of Kentucky, Tennessee, New Mexico, Arkansas,
Colorado, Washington, Indiana, Kansas, New York, Nebraska, South Dakota, Arizona,
Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, and North Carolina, all of which amended their laws
between 1990 and 2001 to exempt mentally retarded offenders from capital punishment);
see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02 (West 2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie
2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-9-401 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a (2004); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West 2004); IND. CODE §§ 35-36-9-2 to 35-36-9-6 (2004); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-4623 (2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.130, 532.135, 532.140 (BanksBaldwin 2004); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2004); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (2004);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie 2004); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney
2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.1 (Michie 2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203
(2004); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030 (2004); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j)
(2004).
33. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315 (citing measures introduced in the legislatures of Virginia
and Nevada); see S.B. 497, 2002 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2002); H.B. 957, 2002 Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2002); A.B. 353, 71st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2001).
34. Atkins, 526 U.S. at 315.
35. Id. at 312 (emphasizing that the Constitution allows the Justices to express their
own views in determining the meaning of the Eighth Amendment). But see id. at 327
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C. A Return to Jury Sentencing in Capital Cases
In 2000, the Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey, a noncapital case involving a challenge to a state sentencing law under which the
defendant received an enhanced sentence after the judge found that racial
bias motivated the defendant to act.36 Apprendi appealed and the Supreme
Court reversed, holding that “any fact . . . that increases the maximum
penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury,
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”37 After undertaking a thorough
historical analysis,38 the Court explained that the jury served to protect
against oppression and tyranny by the ruling class.39 Oddly limiting the
scope of its decision, the Court concluded that Apprendi should have no
effect on capital sentencing schemes that allow judges to find the specific
aggravating factors necessary to sentence a defendant to death.40
Recognizing the tension between Apprendi and Walton v. Arizona, which
upheld judges’ freedom to find aggravating factors that would justify
imposing the death penalty,41 the Supreme Court decided in Ring v.
Arizona that juries, not judges, were required to find the aggravating factors
necessary to sentence a defendant to death.42 The Court reasoned that
aggravating factors operate as statutory elements of capital murder because
an offender cannot receive a death sentence in their absence.43 In response
to states’ efforts to circumvent the Sixth Amendment’s protections by
characterizing facts, like aggravating factors, that increase the penalty
beyond the statutory maximum as sentencing factors,44 the Court explicitly
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (complaining that public opinion polls do not ask whether the
public feels that all mentally retarded people by definition can never act with the level of
culpability associated with the death penalty); id. at 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Seldom has
an opinion of this Court rested so obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its
members.”).
36. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 470 (2000). Charles Apprendi pled guilty to
second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose. Id. at 469-70. Under New
Jersey’s existing hate crime statute, however, he received the equivalent of a first-degree
sentence because he acted with a racially biased purpose. Id. at 470-71.
37. Id. at 476 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 (1999)).
38. See id. at 501-10 (Thomas, J., concurring) (tracing the history of the right to a jury
determination of every fact that creates an independent basis for increasing punishment).
39. Id. at 477.
40. Id. at 496 (distinguishing the facts of Apprendi from capital sentencing schemes that
require a judge to find specific aggravating factors before imposing a death sentence); see
also Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647-49 (1990) (noting that aggravating factors do not
create a new element of capital murder).
41. 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990).
42. 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (noting the importance of jury determinations regarding
any factor that increases a defendant’s punishment).
43. See id. at 599 (explaining that the maximum penalty after a guilty verdict for a
capital crime is life without the possibility of parole). Under Arizona law at the time, for a
death sentence to result, the sentencing court had to find that at least one aggravating factor
outweighed any mitigating factors the defendant presented. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-703(E) (West 2001).
44. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (observing that a legislature’s classification of a
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abolished this semantical distinction in Ring.45 Although the Court
declined to apply Ring retroactively,46 the decision nevertheless has broad
implications and will require a number of states to restructure their capital
sentencing procedures.47
Neither Apprendi nor Ring suggests how states should handle the
procedural determination of mental retardation after Atkins.48 The
confusion over whether a fact constitutes an element of the crime or an
element of the sentence highlights this problem.49 With its recent decision
in Blakely v. Washington,50 the Supreme Court appears unlikely to retreat
from the Sixth Amendment position it adopted in Apprendi and affirmed in
Ring.51 In reiterating the Apprendi rule, Justice Scalia defined the statutory
maximum penalty as the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on
the basis of the facts reflected in the jury’s verdict or admitted by the
defendant.52 Despite criticism,53 a majority of the Court appears committed
to restoring the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee.54
II. THREE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS JUSTIFY JURY DETERMINATION OF
MENTAL RETARDATION
A. Sixth Amendment Right
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that an accused will have “the right to
fact as an element of the crime or a sentencing factor does not provide a principled basis for
treating the facts differently and attaching different constitutional protections to them);
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 89-90 (1986) (protecting the legislature’s ability to
determine the weight and effect given by sentencing courts to the specific circumstances of
a given crime).
45. 536 U.S. at 604.
46. See Schiro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2523 (2004).
47. See Adam Liptak, A Supreme Court Ruling Roils Death Penalty Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 16, 2002, at A14 (explaining that the capital sentencing statutes of Idaho, Montana,
Nebraska, Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana are in jeopardy after Ring).
48. Cf. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800-01 (1982) (forbidding the execution of a
felony murderer who neither killed nor intended to kill without suggesting how states should
assess these facts); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 138 (1987) (permitting the execution of
a felony murderer who played a major role in the homicide and acted with reckless
disregard for human life without establishing a procedure for assessing participation and
mental state).
49. See John Kenneth Zwerling, Comprendez Apprendi?, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 309,
310-11 (2001) (defining elements of an offense and discussing the differences between
sentencing factors and sentence enhancements).
50. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
51. Id. at 2538 (overturning a sentence that a judge increased more than three years
above the statutory maximum sentence because he found that the defendant had acted with
deliberate cruelty).
52. Id. at 2537.
53. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 619 (2002) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Not
only was the decision in Apprendi unjustified in my view, but it also had a severely
destabilizing effect on our criminal justice system.”).
54. See id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that Ring represents a return to the
fundamental meaning of the jury trial guarantee).
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a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . and [the right] to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation . . . against him.”55 The
Supreme Court has interpreted this protection to require that the state prove
to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt any fact that increases the maximum
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.56 The Court
defined “statutory maximum penalty” as any increase in punishment
beyond that which a defendant could have received on the basis of the jury
verdict alone.57 The Constitution also “places a substantive restriction on
the State’s power to take the life of a mentally retarded offender.”58 The
absence of mental retardation, like aggravating factors59 in capital
sentencing proceedings,60 operates as an element of capital murder because
it increases the maximum penalty the offender faces.61 A state cannot,
therefore, impose the death penalty without implementing the proper
procedures for identifying and excluding mentally retarded offenders.62
1.

The absence of mental retardation is an element of capital murder
State legislatures typically have broad discretion in differentiating
elements of a crime from sentencing factors.63 The Supreme Court has
55. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
56. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (asserting that the Sixth
Amendment “entitle[s] a criminal defendant to ‘a jury determination that [he] is guilty of
every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt’”) (quoting
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)).
57. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 602; see also Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537 (“[T]he statutory
maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on
the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”) (emphasis
and internal quotations omitted); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483 (defining statutory maximum as
the punishment supported only by facts found by the jury).
58. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (internal quotations omitted).
59. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12 (West 2004) (enumerating aggravating
factors). The enumerated aggravating factors include: (1) knowingly creating a great risk
of death to more than one person; (2) committing murder for hire; (3) committing an
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel murder; (4) killing to avoid or prevent arrest;
(5) killing while serving a sentence of imprisonment; (6) killing a peace officer performing
an official duty; (7) having a previous conviction for a violent felony; and, (8) constituting a
continuing threat to society. Id.
60. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (upholding Georgia’s
bifurcated sentencing procedure in which the prosecution must prove aggravating factors to
a sentencing authority that weighs them against any mitigating factors); see also Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976) (deriding North Carolina’s use of mandatory
death sentences as insensitive to the constitutional infirmities identified in Furman); Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (plurality opinion) (prohibiting the arbitrary, capricious,
wanton, and freakish imposition of the death penalty). But see Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.
639, 673 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (abandoning the Woodson individuality principle as
inherently inconsistent with Furman’s prohibition against arbitrary and capricious
imposition of the death penalty).
61. Cf. Ring, 536 U.S. at 599 (observing that a death sentence is not available without
proof of an aggravating factor).
62. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
63. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (observing that the
applicability of the Due Process Clause, and the jury trial protections that accompany it, has
always hinged on how a state defines the crime); accord Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
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emphasized, however, that in evaluating a state’s classification of a fact as
an element or a sentencing factor, “the relevant inquiry is not one of form,
but of effect.”64 According to the Supreme Court, the Sixth Amendment
jury trial right hinges on whether “the required finding expose[s] the
defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty
verdict [alone].”65
Each state that imposes the death penalty66 does so through the use of a
bifurcated trial, where the guilt/innocence determination is conducted
separately from the sentencing phase.67 After a guilty verdict in the first
phase of the trial, the maximum punishment a defendant can receive,
197, 206 (1977) (holding that due process does not prohibit a state from assigning the
defendant the burden of proving an affirmative defense). But see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. 684, 698 (1975) (recognizing constitutional limits to a state’s ability to define a crime);
Leslie Yalof Garfield, Back to the Future: Does Apprendi Bar a Legislature’s Power to
Shift the Burden of Proof Away from the Prosecution by Labeling an Element of a Crime an
Affirmative Defense?, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1351, 1355 (2003) (concluding that a legislature
cannot circumvent the protections of the Due Process Clause by simply redefining elements
of a crime as sentencing enhancements or as affirmative defenses).
64. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2002). But see Winston v.
Commonwealth, 604 S.E.2d 21, 46, 50 (Va. 2004) (classifying age and mental retardation as
mitigating factors rather than aggravating factors or elements of the crime because they do
not bar capital convictions); State v. Williams, 831 So. 2d 835, 860 n.35 (La. 2002) (“Atkins
explicitly addressed mental retardation as an exemption from capital punishment, not as a
fact the absence of which operates ‘as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater
offense.’”) (internal citations omitted). Contrary to the Williams Court’s observations, the
absence of mental retardation becomes an element of capital murder, not through Atkins
alone, but through the combination of Atkins and the Supreme Court’s decisions in Apprendi
and Ring. Derek S. Benston, Note, Beyond Statutory Elements: The Substantive Effects of
the Right to a Jury Trial on Constitutionally Significant Facts, 90 VA. L. REV. 645, 676-77
(2004) (explaining how Atkins, Ring, and Apprendi make the absence of mental retardation
an element of capital murder). Similarly, by correctly concluding that age and mental
retardation do not prevent capital convictions, and ending its analysis at that point, the
Winston Court erred by failing to consider that age and mental retardation bar the imposition
of capital punishment. Id. at 46, 50 (emphasis added). Because Sixth Amendment
protections attach to those facts that increase the available punishment, a decision like
Winston, that focuses on a fact’s effect on conviction misses the distinction the Supreme
Court has made between elements of a crime and sentencing factors. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
483 (emphasis added).
65. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494.
66. See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, STATE BY STATE DEATH PENALTY
INFORMATION: STATES WITH THE DEATH PENALTY (2005) (noting that Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have repealed their death
penalty statutes), at www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did =121&scid=11 (on file with
the American University Law Review). Connecticut, Kansas, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, South Dakota and the U.S. military have not carried out an execution since the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of capital punishment in 1976. Id.; see also
People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 367 (N.Y. 2004) (invalidating New York’s death
penalty statute); State v. Marsh, 102 P.3d 445, 466 (Kan. 2004) (invalidating Kansas’ death
penalty statute).
67. See supra note 60 (discussing the constitutionality of bifurcated proceedings); see
also Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the Penalty Phase, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1195, 1215 (2000)
(pointing out that bifurcation is not constitutionally required, but states have used it as a
procedure for ensuring a fair trial).
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without further findings, is life in prison.68 If a state still wants to impose
the death penalty, it must prove at least one aggravating factor to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt69 and show that the aggravating factors
outweigh any mitigating factors70 the defendant presented.71 Because a
defendant cannot receive a death sentence without proof of at least one
aggravating factor, aggravating factors constitute an element of the crime
of capital murder.72
Like aggravating factors, the absence of mental retardation is an element
of capital murder because it increases the maximum penalty a defendant
can receive. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of a mentally
retarded offender.73 As a result, the maximum penalty that a properly
identified74 mentally retarded offender faces is life without parole, while an
offender who does not suffer from mental retardation can receive the death
penalty.75 Because a state may not impose the death penalty without first
excluding mentally retarded offenders, the absence of mental retardation is
68. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 597 (2002) (“Based solely on the jury’s verdict
finding [the defendant] guilty of first-degree felony murder, the maximum punishment he
could have received was life imprisonment.”).
69. Id. at 609.
70. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie 2004) (enumerating mitigating
factors). The statutory mitigating factors include: (1) the defendant lacked a significant
criminal history; (2) the defendant suffered from extreme mental or emotional disturbance;
(3) the victim participated in the defendant’s conduct or consented to the act; (4) the
defendant lacked the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his
behavior to the requirements of the law; (5) the defendant’s age; or, (6) “even if [Atkins does
not apply,] the subaverage intellectual functioning of the defendant.” Id.
71. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 2-303(i)(1) (2004) (“If the court or jury
finds that one or more of the mitigating circumstances . . . exists, it shall determine by a
preponderance of the evidence whether the aggravating circumstances . . . outweigh the
mitigating circumstances.”); see also Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 372 (1988) (vacating
a death sentence imposed under a sentencing statute that only allowed the jury to weigh
unanimously-found mitigating factors against aggravating factors, thereby requiring that the
death penalty be imposed even if all jurors believed that some mitigating factors existed but
the jury as a whole failed to unanimously find any particular mitigating factor); McKoy v.
North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 444 (1990) (reaching the same conclusion).
72. Ring, 536 U.S. at 597; see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)
(requiring jury determination of any fact that increases the maximum penalty an offender
faces).
73. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
74. See Cynthia A. Orpen, Note and Comment, Following in the Footsteps of Ford:
Mental Retardation and Capital Punishment Post-Atkins, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 83, 88 (2003)
(analogizing the effectiveness of protections for insane offenders post-Ford to the
protections for mentally retarded offenders post-Atkins and concluding that the Supreme
Court’s lack of guidance leaves these protections devoid of meaning because of the
difficulty of excluding protected offenders); Roberta M. Harding, “Endgame”: Competency
and the Execution of Condemned Inmates—A Proposal to Satisfy the Eighth Amendment’s
Prohibition Against the Infliction of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB.
L. REV. 105, 117 (1994) (asserting that the variety of approaches taken by the states postFord to prevent the execution of the mentally ill has resulted in a “lack of uniformity [that]
possesses the potential to violate not only Ford, but also the Eighth Amendment principals
embodied in Furman”).
75. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text (discussing those classes of individuals
that the Constitution categorically excludes from execution).

BRAUERMAN.OFFTOPRINTER

412

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/9/2005 1:03:15 PM

[Vol. 54:401

an element of capital murder because its presence precludes the state from
imposing a death sentence.76
The absence of mental retardation is an element of capital murder in the
same way that racially biased motivation and deliberate cruelty act as
elements of their respective statutes in New Jersey and Washington. In
Apprendi, the Court viewed the defendant’s motivation as an element77
because it could potentially increase the defendant’s sentence by ten
years.78 Similarly in Blakely, the Court recognized the elemental nature of
“deliberate cruelty”79 because it had the effect of increasing the defendant’s
penalty by more than three years.80
Like racial bias and deliberate cruelty, the absence of mental retardation
is a fact that increases a penalty beyond that permitted by the jury’s finding
or the defendant’s guilty plea.81 If sentence increases of two, three, or ten
years have constitutional significance, then the difference between life
imprisonment and death must have constitutional significance as well.82
Since the relevant inquiry is one of effect and not form,83 the absence of
76. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text; infra notes 81-84 and accompanying
text (arguing that the state must prove the absence of mental retardation as an element of
capital murder).
77. See 530 U.S. at 494-95 (observing the “elemental nature” of “motive” because it
had the effect of turning a second-degree offense into a first-degree offense). Under New
Jersey law, Apprendi pled guilty to second-degree possession of a firearm, punishable by up
to ten years in prison. Id. at 470-71; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-4a (West 1995). By
sentencing him to twelve years in prison because of his racially biased motive, New Jersey
effectively used a first-degree penalty to punish a second-degree offense. See Apprendi, 530
U.S. at 494.
78. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470 (observing that despite the fact that the state charged
Apprendi with a second-degree offense, it reserved the right to request a higher sentence on
the ground that Apprendi acted with a biased purpose); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West
2004).
79. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2431, 2535 (2004) (invalidating an interpretation
of Washington law that allowed the trial court to impose a sentence of thirty-seven months
beyond the maximum authorized by statute based on its finding that Blakely acted with
deliberate cruelty).
80. Id. at 2543.
81. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 604 (2002); see also Bill Lockyer & Taylor S.
Carey, Capital Punishment and the Mentally Retarded: Implementing Atkins, 15 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 329, 338 (2004) (clarifying that Ring entitles capital defendants to a jury
determination of any fact upon which the legislature conditions an increased punishment).
The Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins conditions an execution on the absence of mental
retardation, consequently placing a constitutional restriction on a legislature’s ability to
increase a maximum penalty and implicating the same Sixth Amendment protections that
would attach if the legislature had set the condition itself. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 321 (2002).
82. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 (finding constitutional significance in a two year
sentence enhancement); Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535 (giving a three year sentence increase
constitutional significance). Justice Stewart’s “death is different” rationale has traditionally
stood for greater, not lesser, protections for capital defendants. See Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 306 (1972).
83. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 (asserting that exposing the defendant to a greater
punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict alone is more compelling than
whether a particular characteristic of the defendant or the crime is characterized as an
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mental retardation becomes an element of capital murder because it has the
effect of increasing the range of punishment an offender can receive.84
An examination of the effect of the fact in question does not, however,
end the constitutional inquiry, and courts should also look at historical
practice to define the scope of the Sixth Amendment.85 Historically, the
criminal jury constituted one of the Framers’ principal protections against
governmental tyranny.86 Although there is no direct historical basis for
requiring jury determination of mental retardation, history cannot dispose
of issues concerning newly recognized constitutional rights.87
Nevertheless, indirect history amply supports the proposition that the Sixth
Amendment requires jury determination of mental retardation.88
In both Apprendi and Blakely, the Supreme Court justified its holdings
with historical principles even though jury findings of racial bias and
deliberate cruelty have no explicit historical support.89 If historical bases
are sufficient to classify racial bias and deliberate cruelty as elements of
crimes for Sixth Amendment purposes, then they are sufficient to classify
the absence of mental retardation as an element of capital murder.
Finally, courts must examine the possibility that the legislature may
abuse its power in classifying a fact as an element of a crime or as a
sentencing factor.90 The risk of abuse of legislative power in the context of
“element” or a “sentencing factor”).
84. Cf. id. at 495 (making racially biased purpose an element of unlawful possession of
a weapon); Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2543 (making deliberate cruelty an element of
kidnapping).
85. See Garfield, supra note 63, at 1383 (explaining that a complete analysis under
Apprendi requires the consideration of the historical principles of punishment with respect
to the appropriate placement of the burden of proof and the risk that the legislature may
overstep its authority in creating sentencing factors).
86. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The founders of the
American Republic were not prepared to leave [sentencing] to the State, which is why the
jury-trial guarantee was one of the least controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights. It has
never been efficient; but it has always been free.”).
87. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The [Eighth] Amendment must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”). Given that the Eighth Amendment evolves to reflect modern values, historical
analysis cannot account for rights, like the prohibition on executing mentally retarded
offenders, that lack historical support. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002).
88. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring) (providing a detailed
historical analysis for the link between jury determination of the elements of a crime and the
specific punishments that follow). See generally Erik Lillquist, The Puzzling Return of Jury
Sentencing: Misgivings About Apprendi, 82 N.C. L. REV. 621, 629-53 (2004) (tracing the
historical development of jury sentencing and concluding that the jury has always played a
role in evaluating the characteristics of offenders and crimes that demand the death penalty).
89. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476-83 (relying upon the historical connection between
jury fact-finding and sentencing); Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538-40 (making explicit the
Court’s commitment to Apprendi and the historical principles essential to its reasoning).
90. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 244 (1999) (“It is therefore no trivial
question to ask whether recognizing an unlimited legislative power to authorize
determinations setting ultimate sentencing limits without a jury would invite erosion of the
jury’s function to a point against which a line must necessarily be drawn.”); see also
Benjamin J. Preister, Constitutional Formalism and the Meaning of Apprendi v. New
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mental retardation is particularly significant because of the Supreme
Court’s minimal guidance on how to identify mentally retarded offenders.91
Like the legislatures of New Jersey and Washington, which
mischaracterized elements as sentencing factors, several states already have
classified improperly mental retardation as a sentencing factor.92 The
confusion that followed Apprendi93 and the lack of consistency among
Court precedent94 only exacerbates this problem.95 Considering the effect,
history, and potential for error, mental retardation is an element of capital
murder, where that distinction is necessary,96 and must receive the
accompanying procedural protections of proof to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Jersey, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 281, 307 (2001) (arguing that the Apprendi Court reasserted
the constitutional importance of distinguishing between the legislature’s powers to define
offenses and regulate sentencing, which had eroded over the years).
91. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (leaving the states to define, identify, and exclude
mentally retarded offenders from the death penalty); cf. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,
416-17 (1986) (placing the burden on the states to develop appropriate procedures for
excluding insane offenders from capital punishment).
92. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(C) (Michie 2004) (placing the
determination of mental retardation in the sentencing phase).
93. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 540 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing “the Court’s
failure to clarify the contours of the constitutional principle underlying its decision”).
According to Justice O’Connor, Apprendi has two possible interpretations: first, a fact must
be submitted to a jury if, as a formal matter, it increases the punishment beyond a statutory
maximum. Id. at 541. Second, a fact must be submitted to a jury if, as a formal matter, it
increases the range of punishment that an offender could face. Id. at 542. If Justice
O’Connor’s second interpretation is accurate, then Apprendi makes the continued viability
of McMillan v. Pennsylvania questionable. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 89
(1986) (allowing a Pennsylvania statute to raise the statutory minimum penalty, thereby
increasing the range of punishment, without proof of fact to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt); see also Preister, supra note 90, at 295-96 (responding to criticisms that state
legislatures can easily avoid Apprendi by drafting statutes with high statutory maximums);
Zwerling, supra note 49, at 312 (identifying three different interpretations of the Apprendi
principle).
94. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998) (excepting prior
convictions from Sixth Amendment protection); McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89 (excluding facts
that increase the statutory minimum penalty from Sixth Amendment protection); Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 619 (2002) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should
overrule Apprendi rather than Walton v. Arizona); accord Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 555 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
95. See Preister, supra note 90, at 302 (supporting the Apprendi principle as a
protective barrier between the legislature’s separate powers to define offenses and regulate
sentences). Preister notes that each of these legislative powers is subject to distinct
constitutional protections, the differences between which are themselves formalistic. Id. at
307.
96. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 475-76 (explaining that labeling a fact as a “sentence
enhancement” or an “element of a crime” does not present a principled basis for treating
facts with similar effects differently).
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The prosecution must prove the absence of mental retardation to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt

The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt97 in a criminal case is a
constitutional requirement98 because of the high stakes99 of such
proceedings. The Apprendi Court remanded for proof beyond a reasonable
doubt because of the seriousness of losing an additional two years of
liberty.100 Similarly in Blakely, the Court focused on the defendant’s
potential loss of three additional years of freedom.101 If the stakes are high
enough to require the government to prove facts that increase the length of
term sentences to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt,102 then similar
protections must apply to facts that increase the punishment from a term of
years to death.103 Considering that an offender’s interest in life outweighs
his interest in liberty, the stakes are highest at a capital trial where the state
attempts to take an offender’s life.104 Given the enormity of what is at
stake in a capital trial, the prosecution must prove the absence of mental
retardation to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.105
97. See Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 457, 458 (1989) (defining the reasonable doubt rule as requiring acquittal if
the jury harbors a reasonable doubt about the veracity or existence of the fact in question).
98. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970) (“This notion—basic in our law and
rightly one of the boasts of a free society—is a constitutional requirement and a safeguard of
due process of law in the historic, procedural content of ‘due process.’”).
99. See id. at 363 (focusing on the potential for defendants in criminal trials to lose their
liberty and the certainty that they would be stigmatized upon conviction); see also Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 484; McMillan, 477 U.S. at 97 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Mullaney v. Wilbur,
421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975).
100. 530 U.S. at 497.
101. 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 (2004).
102. See id.; Apprendi, 430 U.S. at 475-77.
103. See supra notes 63-96 and accompanying text (arguing that the absence of mental
retardation is a fact that increases the maximum penalty that an offender can face); see also
Benston, supra note 64, at 680-81 (noting that Atkins made the absence of mental
retardation a “de facto” element of capital murder). While Benston accurately identifies
mental retardation as an element of capital murder, he incorrectly suggests that the
defendant must bear the burden of proof on the issue. Id. at 685. The Sixth Amendment
places an affirmative burden on the prosecution to prove elements of the crime; it leaves the
defendant without any responsibility to produce any evidence whatsoever. See Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 475-76. Placing this burden on the defendant could violate the Fifth
Amendment’s protection against self incrimination. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
104. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree
but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of
rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique,
finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity.
Id.; see also Sarah Cohen & Deborah Hastings, For 110 Inmates Freed by DNA Tests, True
Freedom Remains Elusive, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 28, 2002 (detailing the devastating
effects of capital convictions upon individuals subsequently exonerated), available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=17&did=293.
105. Cf. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368 (1996) (holding that assigning the
burden of proving competence to stand trial to the defendant by a clear and convincing
standard violates the defendant’s right not to be tried while incompetent).
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The allocation of the burden of proof also serves to balance the risk of
error between the parties in any adjudication.106 In the context of mental
retardation, error can manifest itself through the procedures used to identify
the members of the protected class.107 Although the Supreme Court
declined to define its scope, Atkins’ protections apply to a specific and
identifiable class of defendants.108 To the extent that states have the
freedom to give meaning to Atkins, some statutes may suffer from overinclusiveness and others from under-inclusiveness.109 While over-inclusive
statutes do not present constitutional problems,110 under-inclusive statutes
do.
To illustrate this point, assume that the national consensus identified in
Atkins protects offenders whose intelligence quotient (“IQ”) is seventy or
below.111 Arkansas’ statute, which defines mental retardation as an IQ of
sixty-five or below,112 would fail as constitutionally inadequate because it
would not protect the full class of offenders that Atkins protects. The
Supreme Court did not, however, define the class of offenders who fall
within the protections of the national consensus by announcing an IQ
threshold113 or any other standard.114 Because the meaning of the national
106. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
107. See Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Atkins Aftermath: Identifying Mentally Retarded
Offenders and Excluding them From Execution, 30 J. LEGIS. 77, 86 (2003) (emphasizing
that states disagree about how to determine which offenders are actually mentally retarded);
see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (“To the extent there is serious
disagreement about the execution of mentally retarded offenders, it is in determining which
offenders are in fact retarded.”).
108. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (observing that “[n]ot all people who claim to be
mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded
offenders about whom there is a national consensus”).
109. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie 2003) (excluding those offenders
with an IQ below sixty-five), with 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/114-15 (West 2004)
(providing that an IQ below seventy-five is presumptive evidence of mental retardation).
Based solely on definition, the Illinois statute protects a greater class of offenders than does
its Arkansas counterpart. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie 2003); 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/114-15 (West 2004). Yet neither may comply with Atkins, since states have
no way to know the true meaning of the national consensus until the Supreme Court
provides more guidance. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317. As a categorical exemption, Atkins
may suffer from over or under-inclusiveness, especially where mental retardation is
determined by IQ testing. See Douglas Mossman, Atkins v. Virginia: A Psychiatric Can of
Worms, 33 N.M. L. REV. 255, 268-70 (2003) (denouncing the practice of defining mental
retardation by reference to an IQ of seventy as a statistical, rather than a medical distinction,
and one that can be inaccurate given the five point margin of error in such testing).
110. See State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 222 (Wash. 2003) (acknowledging that state
constitutions may provide greater protections for their citizens than the U.S. Constitution
requires).
111. Atkins does not attempt to quantify the national consensus and explicitly leaves
states with the task of identifying those mentally retarded offenders who fall within the
national consensus. See 536 U.S. at 317.
112. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618.
113. See Mossman, supra note 109, at 268-70 (cautioning that definitions of mental
retardation based solely on IQ are inherently imprecise).
114. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308.
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consensus is unclear, less-inclusive statutes like Arkansas’ may fall short of
Atkins’ constitutional protections.115 Given the enormous potential for
under-inclusion, erroneous determinations of mental retardation,116 and the
availability of alternatives,117 society should not—and the Constitution
does not—allow an offender to bear this risk.
Like the assignment of the burden of proof, the jury trial right provides
important procedural protections. As the Court explained in Apprendi, the
jury serves to check the power of the state.118 In an adversarial proceeding
where the state seeks the death penalty, abuse of power becomes a grave
concern.119 Requiring a jury to determine whether an offender suffers from
mental retardation also protects the integrity of the system.120 Jury
sentencing ensures that only those offenders whom society finds deserving
of the ultimate penalty receive it.121 Considering the effect mental
retardation has on the availability of a death sentence, the risks of underinclusion and erroneous identification, and the jury’s role as a guarantor of
liberty, Sixth Amendment protections must attach to the determination of
mental retardation required to identify which offenders are eligible for the
death penalty.
B. Eighth Amendment Right
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.122 The
Supreme Court has explained that it will evaluate a punishment by the
standards that prevailed in 1791 when the states ratified the Eighth
Amendment123 and by “the evolving standards of decency that mark the
115. See id. at 316 (finding a national consensus against “the practice” of executing
mentally retarded offenders without attempting to define the protected class).
116. Cf. id. at 320-21 (observing that the possibility of false confessions, inability to give
meaningful assistance to counsel, and poor performance as witnesses make mentally
retarded offenders less able to present a powerful argument for mitigation than an offender
not so afflicted).
117. See id. (emphasizing that Atkins merely prohibits states from imposing the most
severe form of punishment on mentally retarded offenders, and does not prohibit the
imposition of lesser punishments).
118. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2002) (“To guard against a spirit of
oppression and tyranny on the part of our rulers and as the great bulwark of our civil and
political liberties, trial by jury has been understood to require that the truth of every
accusation . . . should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of the
defendant’s equals and neighbors.”) (emphasis and internal citations omitted).
119. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971) (interpreting the Fourth
Amendment to require a neutral and detached magistrate to prevent abuse of power by the
state engaged in the competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime).
120. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478 (articulating that a jury determination of elements of
a crime historically left no doubt as to the punishment that would follow the conviction); see
also Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (2004) (observing that the Framers’
paradigm for criminal justice involved a strict division of authority between judge and jury).
121. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968) (articulating that the jury will
express the conscience of the community on the question of life or death).
122. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
123. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976).
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progress of a maturing society.”124 Since 1972, the Court has invalidated
death penalty statutes for providing too little guidance,125 too much
guidance,126 failing to consider the offender as an individual,127
inadequately considering mitigating factors,128 and for findings of
disproportionality129 and excessiveness.130 Although the Supreme Court
already has held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of
mentally retarded offenders, proof of the absence of mental retardation to a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt is necessary to protect the substantive right
Atkins guarantees.131
1. Only a jury can objectively evaluate the “evolving standards of
decency”on a case-by-case basis
In evaluating a national consensus,132 the Supreme Court has consistently
looked to jury verdicts to measure social values.133 Although legislative
enactments may help the Court identify a national consensus in favor of a
124. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
125. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (plurality opinion) (striking down the
death penalty because of the excessive, arbitrary, freakish, and wanton manner in which
states imposed it).
126. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333-34 (1976) (invalidating the state’s
death penalty statute for failing to allow the sentencing authority enough discretion during
the sentencing proceedings).
127. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (explaining that failing
to allow the consideration of the character and record of the individual offender during
sentencing proceedings violates the Constitution).
128. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (finding that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits any limitation on the mitigating factors a sentencing authority can
hear); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (holding that the Ohio death penalty
statute did not meet the requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because it
failed to allow the sentencing authority to consider any and all factors that would argue in
favor of mitigation).
129. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 836 (1988) (considering the death
penalty disproportionate for offenders who are less than sixteen-years-old when they
committed the crime); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (declaring the death
penalty disproportionate for a felony murderer who neither killed nor intended to kill);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (ruling the death penalty disproportionate to the
crime of rape).
130. See supra note 129 (discussing disproportionate penalties). The Court applies the
same Eighth Amendment calculus to determine excessiveness as it does to determine
proportionality. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
131. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
132. See id. at 312 (examining legislative enactments and jury behavior as the most
reliable and objective evidence of contemporary standards).
133. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) (assessing contemporary
values by looking to data concerning the actions of sentencing juries); Enmund, 458 U.S. at
794 (recognizing that the jury is a reliable objective index of contemporary values because
of its close link with the community); see also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 462
(1984) (noting the significance of the jury’s role as a link between the community and the
penal system); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority
for inserting its subjective opinion into the Eighth Amendment calculus where individual
sentencing juries can give effect to the complex societal and moral considerations that
inform the selection of the appropriate criminal penalty better than courts).
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substantive right,134 they cannot adequately determine those individuals
who should benefit from that right.135 The Atkins Court made clear that the
national consensus against executing mentally retarded offenders does not
apply to all people who claim its protections,136 and it may not even apply
to Atkins himself.137
By their very nature, legislatures cannot undertake a case-by-case
analysis; and judges, who could undertake such an analysis, do not reliably
measure community values.138 Only juries can evaluate the unique
circumstances of each individual case, as Atkins impliedly requires.139
Considering the varying abilities and degrees of impairment of mentally
retarded offenders,140 the Constitution requires jury identification of those
mentally retarded offenders who fall within Atkins’ national consensus.
134. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 334 (doubting that two state statutes prohibiting the
execution of mentally retarded offenders coupled with the fourteen states that have rejected
capital punishment altogether adequately support a national consensus); Coker, 433 U.S. at
594-95 (relying on the only state statute authorizing the death penalty for the rape of an
adult woman as evidence of a national consensus against such a disproportionate penalty).
135. The disagreement about which offenders suffer from mental retardation inherently
requires a case by case determination of their mental condition. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.
136. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (noting that not all defendants who argue for the mental
retardation exclusion will have such impairment as to place them within the range of
mentally retarded offenders covered by Atkins); accord Penry, 492 U.S. at 338 (holding that
individualized consideration of mental retardation is necessary for any sentencing
determination).
137. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (accepting Virginia’s argument that Atkins may not
qualify as mentally retarded and remanding for a factual determination of Atkins’ mental
retardation); see also Atkins v. Commonwealth, 581 S.E.2d 514 (Va. 2003) (remanding to
the circuit court for a determination of Atkins’ mental retardation); Adam Liptak, Inmate’s
Rising I.Q. Score Could Mean His Death, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2005, at 114 (explaining that
Atkins’ IQ score has improved as a result of his participation in his defense); Maria Glod,
Jury to Be Killer’s Arbiter Court Says; Under Va. Ruling, Panel Must Decide if Man is
Mentally Retarded, WASH. POST, June 7, 2003, at B1 (reporting on the Virginia Supreme
Court’s decision to remand Atkins for a jury determination of mental retardation).
138. See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 519 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting
that judges may be too responsive to a political climate in which those who covet higher
office must demonstrate their commitment to the death penalty to prove their toughness on
crime, a problem that juries do not face); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)
(discussing the Framers’ fear that judges may be biased or overzealous in their decisions).
139. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (declining to impose universal standards for
determining mental retardation).
140. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 338 (recognizing that mentally retarded persons are
individuals whose abilities and experiences can vary greatly); see also AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
49 (4th ed., Text Revision 2000) (classifying mental retardation as mild, moderate,
profound, or severe); AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION, FACT SHEET: THE
DEATH PENALTY (Mar. 6, 2001), at http://www.aamr.org/Policies/faq_death_ penalty.shtml
(on file with the American University Law Review) [hereinafter FACT SHEET] (emphasizing
the individualized nature of mental retardation and the importance of personalized treatment
programs); Mossman, supra note 109, at 273 (condemning Atkins for discriminatorily
treating all mentally retarded offenders as categorically similar). As Dr. Mossman observes,
“individuals with the same diagnosis may manifest different kinds of symptoms; even when
the symptoms are the same, they may vary widely in their severity. Nor is there a direct or
simple connection between severity of symptoms and impairments that may be relevant to a
particular decision.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
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2. Only a jury can determine whether a punishment responds
proportionallyto individual culpability
In addition to the evolving standards of decency, the Supreme Court also
looks to proportionality in evaluating cruel and unusual punishments.141
The proportionality of a given punishment is directly related to the
circumstances of the crime and the characteristics of the offender,142 and it
reflects a particular judgment about community values.143 In Coker v.
Georgia, the Court explained the relationship between proportionality and
culpability with an emphasis on community values.144 According to the
Supreme Court’s assessment of community values, mental retardation
limits culpability
in the same way that youthfulness,145 insanity,146 mens rea,147 and nature of
the crime148 do. The Court has repeatedly explained that juries are uniquely
capable of determining the proportionality of capital punishment in any
given case, considering their close ties to the community.149

141. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (asserting that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits “barbaric” punishments, as judged by the evolving standards of
decency, and those punishments that are “excessive” in relation to the severity of the crime);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (holding that a punishment is excessive if it is
disproportionate to the severity of the crime).
142. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 319.
143. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(discussing the sociological justification for individual consideration and asserting that
culpability depends on an individual’s background).
144. See 433 U.S. at 592 (stating that a punishment should not inflict needless pain and
suffering and that it must be proportional to the severity of the crime).
145. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 834 (1988) (noting that juvenile
offenders are not as culpable as their adult counterparts).
146. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) (initiating extra protections
for insane offenders because of their diminished culpability).
147. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (finding felony murderers who
neither killed nor intended to kill less culpable than intentional murderers). But see Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 150-54 (1985) (diminishing Enmund’s protections because felony
murderers who are major participants in a crime and act with reckless disregard for human
life have the same culpability as intentional murderers and should receive the same
punishment).
148. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (considering rapists less culpable than murderers and
excluding them from death penalty eligibility).
149. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 615-16 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(marshaling support for the argument that juries possess comparative advantages over
judges in determining the propriety of capital punishment in each case); Spaziano v. Florida,
468 U.S. 447, 486 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining
that a jury “reflect[s] more accurately the composition and experiences of the community as
a whole”); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968) (observing that a jury is more
likely to “express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or
death”); see also Huigens, supra note 67, at 1202-04 (insisting that the Eighth Amendment’s
concern with culpability is really an effort to punish offenders with respect to what they
“deserve” based on community values).
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The fact that the Atkins Court confused its analysis150 and failed to
consider fully the excessiveness of executing mentally retarded offenders
does not leave proportionality assessments devoid of constitutional
significance.151 Had the Atkins Court considered this element, it would
have concluded that executing mentally retarded offenders leads to the
unnecessary imposition of pain and suffering.152 Because individual
culpability depends on the values of the community, the Eighth
Amendment requires a jury determination of an offender’s mental
retardation.153
Excessiveness also depends on whether a particular punishment serves
the acceptable goals of punishment.154 According to the Court, a
punishment can serve as a deterrent only when the crime results from
premeditation and deliberation.155 A punishment’s specific deterrent
effect156 depends on an individual’s ability to anticipate consequences and
150. See generally Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (omitting any discussion of
whether the execution of a mentally retarded offender is an unnecessary infliction of pain
and suffering).
151. See id. at 311-12 (judging excessiveness by the evolving standards of decency).
The Atkins Court confuses the two separate prongs of Eighth Amendment analysis:
(1) whether the punishment is “cruel and unusual” and (2) whether it is excessive. Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173-74 (1976). In Trop v. Dulles, the case that sets the context and
rules for the Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis, the Court uses the evolving standards of
decency to determine the meaning of “cruel and unusual.” 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958). In
Atkins, the Court relies on evolving standards to determine whether the execution of
mentally retarded offenders is “cruel and unusal,” and fails to undertake a separate
excessiveness analysis as required by the Eighth Amendment. 536 U.S. at 321. This
problem does not, however, threaten the legitimacy of the Court’s ruling because the Court
must at a minimum find that the practice violates one prong of the analysis to hold that it
violates the Eighth Amendment. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
152. See Rex Bowman, Judge: Inmate Should Remain on Death Row, RICH. TIMESDISPATCH, Mar. 5, 2004, at B1, available at 2004 WL 61898880. “Walton is incapable of
coherent, prolonged conversation, does not bathe and believes he can get a motorcycle,
telephone and a job at Burger King after his execution.” Id. Like Atkins who has an IQ of
fifty-nine, Walton has an IQ of sixty-six and suffers from similar, if not worse, impairments.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309; cf. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (explaining that “those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to
suffer and why they are to suffer it” cannot constitutionally be executed).
153. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he
sentence imposed . . . should reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant’s
background, character, and crime . . . .”) (emphasis in original).
154. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (identifying retribution and deterrence as the acceptable
penological goals of capital punishment).
155. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 799 (1982). Like heat of passion or provocation,
premeditation and deliberation are elements of the crime of murder. See, e.g., Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 696 (1975). As components of a defendant’s mens rea, the Sixth
Amendment requires the prosecution to independently prove these facts to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id.; see also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998);
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
156. See William C. Bailey & Ruth D. Peterson, Murder, Capital Punishment and
Deterrence: A Review of the Literature, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT
CONTROVERSIES 135, 136 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997) (defining specific deterrence as the
punishment necessary to prevent the individual offender from killing again). The Eighth
Amendment analysis must focus on specific rather than general deterrence because
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control his behavior to avoid them.157 The assessment of this ability
necessarily depends on community values.158
Mentally retarded offenders do not act with the “cold calculus that
precedes the decision”159 of other murderers, and consequently their
punishments will not serve a deterrent purpose.160 As a result, the
exclusion of mentally retarded offenders from capital eligibility will not
diminish whatever general deterrent effect the death penalty may have.161
Not all mentally retarded offenders have the same level of impairment,162
and some may have the capacity to act deliberately.163 To the extent that
the effectiveness of deterrence depends on the capacity of an individual
offender, only the jury can undertake the individual assessment necessary
to distinguish those offenders who act with premeditation and deliberation
from those who do not.164
Retribution presents the strongest justification for an Eighth Amendment
right to a jury determination of mental retardation.165 Retribution is the
culpability depends on the characteristics of the individual offender. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at
183.
157. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21 (“The theory of deterrence in capital sentencing
is predicated upon the notion that the increased severity of the punishment will inhibit
criminal actors from carrying out murderous conduct.”).
158. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
159. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186 (noting that there are some murders, such as murder for
hire, where murderers likely consider that they may be subject to the death penalty before
they act).
160. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319-20 (concluding that the cognitive and behavioral
impairments that make mentally retarded offenders less culpable make it less likely that they
can process the possibility of execution and control their behavior as a result). See generally
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614-15 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (questioning the
deterrent effect of the death penalty in general and citing academic studies supporting his
conclusions); Ernest van den Haag, On Deterrence and the Death Penalty, in PUNISHMENT
AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE CURRENT DEBATE 125, 125-35 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E.
Rosenbaum eds., 1995) (questioning the deterrent effect of the death penalty); Daniel M.
Farrell, The Justification of General Deterrence, in PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION 38,
39-60 (Jeffrie G. Murphy ed., 3d ed. 1995) (arguing that “wrongdoers may be punished
beyond what is necessary to keep them from doing wrong again—if so punishing them can
plausibly be said to be likely to deter others from doing wrong themselves”) (emphasis in
original).
161. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320 (noting that the exclusion of mentally retarded offenders
will not minimize the general deterrent effect of the death penalty because non-mentally
retarded offenders can still receive a death sentence).
162. See supra note 140 (emphasizing that mentally retarded offenders suffer differing
degrees of impairment and that they can act with varying degrees of culpability,
consequently requiring individualized consideration to determine whether a particular
punishment, for a particular individual, serves an acceptable goal of punishment).
163. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (leaving to the states to determine whether a specific
individual is mentally retarded and whether that individual has the capacity to act
deliberately).
164. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968) (highlighting the jury’s
unique ability to express the conscience of the community on the propriety of a given
punishment).
165. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that the jury,
as a representative of the community, is more competent than a judge to determine whether
capital punishment will serve its necessary retributive purpose).
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community’s moral response to a particular crime.166 Comprised of
members of the community, a jury “remains uniquely capable of
determining whether, given the community’s views, capital punishment is
appropriate.”167 The characteristics of mentally retarded offenders that
make the death penalty disproportionate and ineffective as a deterrent
involve the individual culpability determinations that retributive analysis
requires.
Mentally retarded offenders tend to act on impulse rather than pursuant
to a plan, tend to follow rather than lead, make poor witnesses, and have
difficulty controlling their behavior and appreciating the wrongfulness of
their conduct.168 No one suggests that these offenders should escape
criminal liability altogether,169 only that the Court’s Eighth Amendment
narrowing jurisprudence170 requires states to limit capital eligibility to the
worst offenders.171 Because impairment varies depending on the severity
and extent of mental retardation,172 retributive analysis necessarily involves
an assessment of social values.173 Consequently, juries must consider the
extent of offenders’ mental retardation in determining the retributive
purpose their execution would serve.174
166. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (“[C]apital punishment is an
expression of society’s moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct.”). See generally
Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION
94 (Jeffrie G. Murphy ed., 1995) (defining retribution and justifying it as a theory of
punishment).
167. Ring, 536 U.S. at 616 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
168. See Lockyer & Carey, supra note 81, at 333 (identifying characteristics of mentally
retarded offenders that make them less culpable); Mossman, supra note 109, at 267
(highlighting the behavior of mentally retarded offenders that distinguishes them from the
general community); James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal
Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 429 (1985) (detailing the impulse control
problems that typify mentally retarded offenders).
169. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) (insisting that mentally retarded
offenders’ deficiencies do not warrant exemption from criminal sanctions); see also Lockyer
& Carey, supra note 81, at 333-34 (noting that society views mentally retarded offenders as
less culpable, though not completely blameless, for criminal acts).
170. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186. The Court’s narrowing jurisprudence seeks to
ensure that only those most deserving of death sentences receive them. See Atkins, 536 U.S.
at 319; see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988) (preventing the
execution of juvenile offenders younger than sixteen); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,
410 (1986) (exempting insane offenders from capital punishment); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782, 799 (1982) (excluding felony murderers who neither killed nor attempted to kill
from death penalty eligibility).
171. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184 (observing that capital punishment may be appropriate
in extreme cases as a response to certain crimes that are so “grievous an affront to
humanity” that the only adequate response is the death penalty).
172. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318 (noting that while some mentally retarded persons know
the difference between right and wrong and can conform their behavior to the requirements
of the law, others may not have the same ability).
173. See id. (recognizing that identifying the worst offenders is a social judgment that
can only be accomplished by members of the community, whose values form that
judgment).
174. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 410 (noting that once the Constitution recognizes a
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C. Due Process Right
Both the Sixth and Eighth Amendment protections discussed in the
preceding two sections apply to the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.175 The Supreme Court has not addressed
whether the Due Process Clause provides an independent basis for an
offender’s right to a jury determination of whether the offender is mentally
retarded.176 Once the Court recognizes a due process right, it applies either
the Patterson v. New York “historical basis”177 test or the Mathews v.
Eldridge “balancing test”178 to determine the appropriate placement of the
burden of proof.179
1.

Due process requires the state to provide a capital defendant with a
mental retardation hearing
The Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove all of the
elements included in the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt.180
The absence of mental retardation constitutes an element of capital
murder181 and therefore requires proof to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.182 The Due Process Clause also affords individuals the right to a fair
substantive right, states must enforce it using any procedures necessary to ensure its
protections). In the context of the mental retardation exclusion, this rule requires a
consideration of the retributive purposes served by the penalty. Id.
175. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968)
(explaining the doctrine of incorporation). Incorporation is the process through which
“many of the rights guaranteed by the first eight Amendments to the Constitution have been
held to be protected against state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Id.
176. The Court has, however, expanded the Due Process Clause to find other procedural
protections. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 86-87 (1985) (finding a due process
right to a psychological expert); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963)
(guaranteeing criminal defendants the right to counsel on their first appeal of right); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (recognizing a criminal defendant’s due process right to a
free transcript on appeal). But see Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974) (refusing to
recognize a due process right to counsel for indigent criminal defendants on discretionary
appeals).
177. 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977) (finding that state laws assigning burdens of proof in
criminal cases comport with due process unless they violate traditionally-held fundamental
principles of justice).
178. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (analyzing due process claims by balancing the private
interest at stake; the risk of error inherent in the procedures used to deprive the private
individual of that interest, and the potential value “of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards;” and the government’s interest in the matter).
179. Compare Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201-02 (evaluating the assignment of a burden of
proof on the basis of fundamental principles of justice), with Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335
(articulating a three-pronged interest-balancing test for determining the appropriate
placement of the burden of proof).
180. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (noting that a state
legislature’s definition of the elements of a crime and the facts that must be demonstrated to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt are generally presumed to comport with due process).
181. See supra notes 63-96 and accompanying text (justifying the treatment of mental
retardation as an element of capital murder).
182. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85.
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hearing.183 In the wake of Atkins, the due process right to be heard
requires, at a minimum, that states provide capital defendants with a
mechanism for identifying mental retardation.184 Since Atkins established
new due process rights for capital offenders, states must determine how
best to protect these rights.
2.

Patterson’s historical basis test does not apply to newly recognized
substantive rights
The Supreme Court has embraced Patterson’s historical test for
determining the appropriate placement of the burden of proof.185 Under
Patterson, a state regulation violates the Due Process Clause only if it
offends a fundamental principle of justice.186 According to the Court,
Patterson shows the proper respect for state power187 while still protecting
constitutional rights.188
Under Patterson’s deferential approach, a state could require defendants
to prove mental retardation and force them to bear the burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence,189 clear and convincing evidence,190 or
183. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”) (internal
quotations omitted); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974) (requiring
some form of a hearing before the state can deprive an individual of a property interest);
Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any
kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a
principle basic to our society.”).
184. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (recognizing that the government must provide
private individuals some form of hearing when depriving them of constitutionally-protected
rights).
185. See, e.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992) (applying Patterson’s
historical basis test and discarding the Mathews balancing test to evaluate the placement of
the burden of proof on the defendant in a competency proceeding by a preponderance of the
evidence).
186. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1968).
187. See id. at 201 (concluding that the onus of preventing and dealing with crime
belongs to the states rather than the federal government).
188. See id. at 202 (indicating that the Court will strike down state procedures that
offend “some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental”) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958)).
189. See Tobolowsky, supra note 107, at 119 (recommending that states assign the
defendant “the burden of proof to establish mental retardation by a preponderance of the
evidence”). Several states have adopted this view and placed the burden of proof on the
defendant to establish mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence. See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-4-618(c) (Michie 2003); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376(b)(3) (West 2004);
IDAHO CODE § 19-2515A(3) (Michie 2004); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/114-15(b) (2004); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 905.5.1(C)(1) (West 2004); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2202(b)(2)(ii) (2004); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.030(4)(1) (West 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §
28-105.01(4)(b)(ii) (Michie 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. 174.098(5)(b) (2004); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-20A-2.1(C) (Michie 2004); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(12)(e) (McKinney 2004),
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.3 (Michie 2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203(c)
(2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15a-104(12)(a) (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(C)
(Michie 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030(2) (West 2004).
190. Some states require the defendant to prove mental retardation by clear and
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possibly even beyond a reasonable doubt.191 With the recent development
of a national consensus,192 our society has no fundamental notions of
justice about how to prevent the execution of mentally retarded
offenders.193 As long as a state provides defendants the opportunity to
present evidence of their mental retardation, the state procedure will
survive constitutional scrutiny under Patterson’s historical basis test.
Under a broader interpretation of “fundamental notions of justice,” state
procedures for identifying and excluding mentally retarded offenders from
capital punishment could fail Patterson’s historical basis test.194 If the
Court accepts that the Eighth Amendment ranks in society as a fundamental
notion of justice,195 then the Court should view all of its protections as
fundamental.196 This would include newly recognized rights like the
exclusion of mentally retarded offenders from the death penalty.197
Admittedly, classifying a newly recognized right as historically
fundamental seems counterintuitive, and the Court will probably not find
such an argument persuasive.
More likely, a Patterson analysis would justify any state procedure that
allows a defendant the opportunity to be heard.198 Consequently, any state
convincing evidence. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02(G) (West 2004); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1102(2) (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 11-4209(D)(3)(b)
(2003), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137(4) (West 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-4(b) (West
2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005(c) (2004).
191. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(c)(3) (Harrison 2004) (placing the burden of proof
on the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt). Other states fail to specify the applicable
burden of proof. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(h)(2) (West 2004); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-4623 (2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.135 (Michie 2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 1175.5(3) (West 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(10) (Law. Co-op. 2003).
192. Compare Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989) (finding the evidence
insufficient to recognize a national consensus against the execution of mentally retarded
offenders in 1989), with Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002) (recognizing such a
consensus in 2002).
193. Cf. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446 (1992) (observing that there is no
settled tradition on the proper allocation of the burden of proof in a competency proceeding
and upholding California’s procedure of placing the burden of proof on the defendant by a
preponderance of the evidence).
194. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977); see also supra notes 185-88
and accompanying text (discussing the Patterson historical basis test).
195. The Eighth Amendment constitutes a “principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of [the American] people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Patterson, 432
U.S. at 202. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of mentally retarded offenders.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. Although the state does not have to adopt a procedure that is more
favorable to the defendant, it must observe procedures adequate to protect a mentally
retarded offender’s right not to be executed. See Medina, 505 U.S. at 449.
196. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The [Eighth] Amendment draws its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”).
197. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (finding that imposing the death penalty on mentally
retarded individuals violates the Eighth Amendment).
198. See Medina, 505 U.S at 449 (“Once a state provides a defendant access to
procedures . . . we perceive no basis for holding that due process further requires the state to
assume the burden of vindicating the defendant’s constitutional right by persuading the trier
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procedure that allowed for the consideration of an offender’s mental
retardation would pass constitutional muster.199 As a newly recognized
right, the mental retardation exclusion could not meet Patterson’s
deferential standard.200 Considering the Supreme Court’s questionable
application of Patterson,201 and confusion about its applicability to newly
recognized rights,202 the Court should not rely on the historical basis test to
evaluate the procedures states use to exclude mentally retarded offenders
from the death penalty.
3. The Supreme Court should use the Mathews balancing test to assign
the burden of proof
Although the Supreme Court has suggested that the Mathews test does
not apply to criminal procedure issues,203 this position is irreconcilable with
other Court decisions.204 Considering that the Court actually applies the
Mathews test despite its claims to the contrary,205 coupled with the fact that
Mathews allows for a more accurate assessment of the interests involved in
assigning the burden of proof,206 due process analysis requires some
comparison of the state’s interests with those of the defendant.207
of fact.”).
199. See id.; see also Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201-02 (noting that state procedural rules do
not violate the Due Process Clause unless they offend a fundamental principle of justice).
200. See 432 U.S. at 197.
201. Patterson’s continued utility as a tool for due process analysis is uncertain after the
Court’s decision in Medina, which while affirming the historical test as correct, effectively
applied the Mathews’ balancing test. See Medina, 505 U.S. at 454 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment) (suggesting that the majority’s rejection of Mathews is
inappropriate considering it could have reached the same result by applying the Mathews
balancing test); see also Bruce J. Winick, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof in
Determining Competency to Stand Trial: An Analysis of Medina v. California and the
Supreme Court’s New Due Process Methodology in Criminal Cases, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV.
817, 827 (1993) (criticizing the majority opinion in Medina for applying a balancing inquiry
that cannot be meaningfully distinguished from the three-factor test it claims to disavow).
202. See Winick, supra note 201, at 864 (1993) (suggesting that the Medina test does not
allow the Court to recognize new forms of injustice or to prohibit historically acceptable
practices that seem increasingly unjust).
203. See Medina, 505 U.S. at 444 (noting that the Mathews test was designed to address
due process issues related to administrative proceedings); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (evaluating the requirements of due process in an administrative law
hearing).
204. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (applying the Mathews
balancing test to determine the due process requirements of providing psychological experts
to indigent offenders in criminal cases); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 680 (1980)
(finding no due process violation where an appellate court relies on a trial court’s finding of
facts in a criminal case under de novo review after applying the Mathews test); see also
Medina, 505 U.S. at 453 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (observing that the
majority cannot distinguish Ake without disavowing the analysis that supports the decision).
But see Medina, 505 U.S. at 444 (claiming that the Mathews analysis was not essential to
results reached in Ake or Raddatz).
205. See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 365 (1996) (applying Mathews implicitly
by weighing the state’s interests against those of the defendant).
206. See Winick, supra note 201, at 866 (proposing that the Court discard the Patterson
test as unduly rigid and unable to adequately protect fundamental fairness and due process
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The first prong of the Mathews balancing test involves the consideration
of the private interest at stake.208 Facing the death penalty, the defendant’s
interest, is quite simply, his life.209 This interest in life is greater than his
interest in liberty,210 in being tried while competent,211 in having effective
assistance of counsel,212 in accessing mental health experts,213 and certainly
greater than retaining an interest in property.214 Given the enormity of this
interest,215 proper respect for life216 would require the most stringent
protections to ensure that only the most deserving of offenders receive the
ultimate punishment.217
Second, a Mathews analysis requires a consideration of “the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.”218
Placing the burden of proving mental retardation on a defendant, even by a
of law).
207. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
208. Id.
209. Cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 741 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(“The value to others of a person’s life is far too precious to allow the individual to claim a
constitutional entitlement to complete autonomy in making a decision to end that life.”).
Ted Barrett et al., Federal Court Set to Hear Schiavo’s Case, CNN.com, Mar. 21, 2005, at
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/03/21/schiavo/ index.html (on file with American
University Law Review) (quoting President George W. Bush: “In cases like this one, where
there are serious questions and substantial doubts, our society, our laws and our courts
should have a presumption in favor of life.”). But see Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276
(1976) (allowing a state to differentiate among the value of human life in certain
circumstances).
210. Cf. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (observing that individual’s
interest in liberty prevents involuntary civil commitment absent proof that he poses a threat
to himself or society).
211. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966) (asserting that the conviction of a
legally incompetent accused violates due process).
212. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (requiring proof that the
attorney’s conduct violated professional standards and that these errors prejudiced the
defendant in order to state a claim for ineffective representation).
213. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (requiring states to provide mental
health experts at trial because the lack of such expert testimony could be devastating to a
successful defense).
214. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (holding that only minimal due
process protections are required for the state to deprive an individual of a property interest).
215. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(focusing on the risks at stake in a capital trial and arguing that the imposition of the death
penalty involves extraordinary consideration).
216. See Damien P. DeLaney, Better to Let Ten Guilty Men Live: The Presumption of
Life—A Principle to Govern Capital Sentencing, 14 CAP. DEF. J. 283, 285 (2002) (arguing
“that an individual’s liberty interest outweighs the government’s interest in punishing
criminals”).
217. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (noting that previous case law
required any capital sentencing scheme to significantly distinguish the few cases to which
the death penalty applied from the many to which it did not); see also Robert Blecker,
Among Killers, Searching for the Worst of the Worst, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2000, at B1
(grappling with the problem of identifying the worst offenders who deserve the death
penalty).
218. 424 U.S. at 335.
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preponderance of the evidence, risks excluding some offenders covered by
the national consensus.219 Mentally retarded offenders will have the same
difficulty proving mental retardation as they have showing mitigation.220
Placing the burden of proof on the state, however, would reallocate this risk
and cautiously err on the side of life, rather than death.221 Considering the
defendant’s immense interest in life and the possible error inherent in
mental retardation determinations, the Due Process Clause requires the
prosecution to bear the burden of proving the absence of mental retardation
before imposing the death penalty.
Finally, one must look to the government’s interest and balance it against
the factors discussed in the preceding two paragraphs.222 Admittedly a
state has a strong interest in punishing an offender it has already
convicted.223 Unlike competence224 or sanity225 determinations, an offender
adjudicated mentally retarded does not avoid punishment altogether,226 but
rather the defendant only escapes the imposition of the death penalty.
Placing the burden of proof on the prosecution would not interfere with a
state’s ability to punish dangerous offenders or protect society;227 it simply
requires the state to prove one additional fact, which it would have to prove
anyway, before imposing the ultimate penalty.228
219. See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 363 (1996) (noting that the procedure at
issue in Medina created problems when the evidence is equal). In other words, Medina
allowed a state to try an offender whom the evidence showed was just as likely competent as
not. 505 U.S. 437, 449 (1992). Under this analysis, a state could execute an offender who
is just as likely mentally retarded as not, even though the offender would have diminished
culpability and could fall within Atkins’ national consensus. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
220. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21 (justifying a prohibition on the execution of mentally
retarded offenders by suggesting that such individuals are less capable of persuasively
establishing mitigating factors because of their handicap).
221. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 283 (1990) (declaring that
the purpose of a standard of proof is to place the risk of error on the party that would suffer
least from any potential error).
222. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (indicating that the examination
of the state’s interest should focus on, among other considerations, the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedure would require).
223. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 425 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
224. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966) (preventing the state from trying an
incompetent offender, even when the offender waives the right to a hearing).
225. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795 (1952) (recognizing insanity as an
affirmative defense that allowed the defendant to escape all criminal liability and receive
mental health treatment rather than punishment).
226. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002) (embracing the notion that
mentally retarded persons should be tried and punished when they commit crimes). The
Atkins holding only excludes mentally retarded offenders from capital eligibility, not
punishment altogether. Id. at 318-21.
227. See id. at 318 (emphasizing the national consensus supporting some form of
criminal sanctions for mentally retarded offenders because such individuals can often
distinguish between right and wrong and can competently stand trial, although their mental
deficiencies somewhat diminish their culpability for the crimes they may commit).
228. Cf. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 599 (2002) (requiring the state to prove
additional aggravating facts before sentencing an offender to death).
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A state also has an interest in minimizing the expense of the death
penalty and ensuring the integrity of its criminal justice system.229
Requiring the state to prove mental retardation does not, however,
significantly increase costs230 since the death penalty already requires jury
sentencing.231 Fears about the defendant feigning mental retardation could
support the placement of the burden on the defendant.232 Unlike questions
of competence,233 malingering in mental retardation determinations does
not pose a significant threat234 and certainly does not outweigh the
defendant’s interest in life. Applying the Mathews test by balancing an
individual’s interest in life against the state’s interest in punishment,
coupled with the minimal burden placed on the state,235 due process
requires the state to bear the burden of proving mental retardation before
imposing the death penalty.236
229. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78-80 (1985) (assessing the economic impact of
providing psychiatric assistance to defendants presenting an insanity defense and the risk of
error that might arise if such services are not made available).
230. See id. at 79 (recognizing that providing a mental health expert in a criminal case is
well worth the cost to the state when considering the threat to an offender’s liberty); Richard
C. Dieter, Millions Misspent: What Politicians Don’t Say About the High Costs of the
Death
Penalty
(Fall
1994),
at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?
scid=45&did=385#sxn (on file with the American University Law Review) (criticizing
politicians for allowing the death penalty to escape the type of cost-benefit analysis that all
other criminal justice programs receive). Even where cost is inapposite, permitting or
denying an exclusionary procedure on the basis of cost alone seems incompatible with
common notions of fair play and justice considering the value society places on human life.
Id.
231. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 599 (requiring that the jury, not the judge, determine the
existence of aggravating factors); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976) (approving
Georgia’s bifurcated capital sentencing procedure where a jury determines the guilt and
punishment of a defendant in two separate stages).
232. Cf. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 365 (1996) (acknowledging that the
possibility of defendants lying about their mental incompetence may add additional costs to
a trial and frustrate a state in the “prompt disposition of criminal charges”).
233. See Winick, supra note 201, at 840-41 (discussing Justice O’Connor’s concurring
opinion in Medina v. California, which argued that placing the burden of proof on
defendants to prove their incompetence gives them more incentive to cooperate with
psychiatric evaluators and reduces the risk of feigning; Justice O’Connor also noted that
competence is a condition that can fluctuate over time).
234. See James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State
Legislative Issues, 27 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 11, 13-14 (2003) (reviewing
literature on malingering and arguing that feigning has not proven to be a practical problem
in assessing mental retardation); Lockyer & Carey, supra note 81, at 336 (noting that the
“age of onset” requirement in professional definitions of mental retardation ensures that
defendants may not feign mental retardation once charged with a capital offense) (quoting
Ellis, supra).
235. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
236. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (“[I]f the constitution renders the
fact or timing of [an] execution contingent upon establishment of a further fact, then that
fact must be determined with the high regard for truth that befits a decision affecting the life
or death of a human being.”); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 365 (1996)
(placing the burden of proof on the government to establish the defendant’s mental state
because the government can hold an incompetent defendant in custody to determine whether
he will attain competence in the future).
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4.
is

At a minimum, due process requires the state to show that an offender
not mentally retarded by a probable cause standard
When the state bears the burden of proof in criminal procedure, it must
satisfy either a probable cause237 or a beyond a reasonable doubt238
standard.239 The probable cause standard applies when state action
infringes on a constitutional right.240 The reasonable doubt standard
applies when the state attempts to deprive an individual of life, liberty, or
property.241 The execution of mentally retarded offenders would violate a
constitutional right242 and deprive individuals of their interest in life,
potentially implicating either standard. Given the Supreme Court’s
preference for deferential review, the Due Process Clause at least requires
the prosecution to bear the burden of proof by a probable cause standard
and could even justify placing a higher burden on the state.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
After recognizing that the government must prove the absence of mental
retardation to a jury, states may implement a variety of procedures to
protect this right. Each of these procedures requires an explicit definition
of mental retardation, and states should consider using the definitions the
Supreme Court relied upon in Atkins to achieve cross-jurisdictional
uniformity.243 As long as state legislatures place the burden of proving the
absence of mental retardation on the prosecution, they have the freedom to
place this determination in a pretrial hearing, in the guilt/innocence phase
237. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (“[P]robable cause is a fluid
concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not
readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”).
238. See Sundby, supra note 97, at 458 (observing that the reasonable doubt standard
gives practical effect to the constitutional requirement that criminal defendants be presumed
innocent until proven guilty).
239. See Ronald J. Allen, Rationality and Accuracy in the Criminal Process: A
Discordant Note on the Harmonizing of the Justices’ Views on Burdens of Persuasion in
Criminal Cases, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1147, 1148 (1983) (explaining that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is the standard burden of proof in criminal cases).
240. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 86 (1979) (requiring the state to show
probable cause before searching an individual without a warrant); United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976) (requiring the state to show probable cause for a warrantless
public arrest); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1958) (requiring the state to
show probable cause before seizing private property).
241. See, e.g., McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (reiterating the rule
that the prosecution must prove elements of a crime to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt).
242. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (identifying an Eighth
Amendment protection that prohibits the execution of mentally retarded offenders).
243. See Ellis, supra note 234, at 14 (recommending that the states adopt the American
Association of Mental Retardation’s (“AAMR”) definition of mental retardation in their
mental retardation exclusion statutes); Tobolowsky, supra note 107, at 89 (cautioning states
to ensure that their definitions of mental retardation are at least as comprehensive as the
clinical definitions referenced by the Court in Atkins); see also infra note 248 (presenting
the AAMR’s and American Psychiatric Association’s (“APA”) definitions of mental
retardation).
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of trial or in the sentencing phase.
A. States Should Adopt a Rational and Uniform Definition of
Mental Retardation
The Atkins Court admitted that identifying and excluding mentally
retarded offenders from the death penalty would constitute the most
difficult part of implementing its decision.244 Studies estimate that
approximately one to three percent of the population suffers from mental
retardation245 and four to twenty percent of offenders on death row are
mentally retarded.246 The identification of mentally retarded offenders
depends on the definition a state legislature adopts.247 State legislatures
should consider adopting the definitions relied upon by the Supreme Court
in Atkins.
Both of the clinical definitions the Supreme Court referenced in Atkins
contain three main components:
intellectual functioning, adaptive
behavior, and age of onset.248 Experts measure intellectual functioning
primarily through IQ testing.249 Although informative, IQ testing should
not dispose of the mental retardation question, and states should rely on it
cautiously.250 The adaptive behavior component evaluates the practical
244. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (noting that Virginia disputes Atkins’ mental retardation
and that not all mentally retarded offenders fall within the Eighth Amendment’s protection
because not all offenders are so mentally retarded that their execution would offend the
contemporary standards of decency).
245. See FACT SHEET, supra note 140 (stating that between 4% and 10% of the
individuals in the criminal justice system are mentally retarded, compared to 1.5% to 2.5%
of the general public).
246. See Tobolowsky, supra note 107, at 86 (indicating that approximately 140 to 170
death row inmates in the United States are deemed mentally retarded out of a total death row
population of 3,500).
247. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-12b01(d) (2003) (defining mental retardation as
“significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning . . . manifested during the period
of birth to age 18”), with MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(b)(1)(ii) (2004) (establishing
the age of onset of mental retardation at twenty-two).
248. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3 (citing favorably the definitions of mental retardation
provided by the AAMR and the APA); see AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL
RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF
SUPPORTS 1 (Ruth Luckasson ed., 10th ed. 2002) (“Mental retardation is a disability
characterized by significant limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive
behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills . . . originat[ing]
before age 18.”); AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 140, at 41 (defining
mental retardation as “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning . . . accompanied by
significant limitations in adaptive functioning . . . occur[ring] before age 18 years”).
249. See Mossman, supra note 109, at 267-68 (noting that mental health professionals
use IQ tests to measure intellectual capabilities and identify mentally retarded individuals).
250. See id. at 268-70 (explaining that an IQ score refers to a placement along a “bell
curve” where the average is 100 and the standard deviation is 15). Approximately 95% of
the population falls within two standard deviations of the mean, ranging between 70-130.
Id. Consequently, an IQ score of 70 represents a statistical convention rather than a
psychological determination and individuals on either side of that line may suffer similar
deficiencies. Id. But see ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie 2003) (establishing “a
rebuttable presumption of mental retardation when a defendant has an intelligence quotient
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effects of an offender’s intellectual disability.251 Age of onset is crucial to
a definition of mental retardation,252 because it virtually eliminates the risk
of malingering253 and provides an objective basis for assessment.254
Despite criticism from academics, these definitions provide some, albeit
minimal, guidance for judges and juries to use in identifying mentally
retarded offenders.255 Although state legislatures have the freedom to
implement Atkins how they see fit, they should take care to include each of
these components in their definitions of mental retardation.
While the Supreme Court left the states with the onerous burden of
identifying mentally retarded offenders, the Court’s Furman decision
requires a degree of uniformity among their definitions.256 Adopting the
definitions of mental retardation advocated by the American Association of
Mental Retardation and the American Psychiatric Association would
minimize the risks of arbitrary imposition of the death penalty and give
proper deference to the experts familiar with determining, treating, and
defining mental health problems. Without cooperation among the states, or
of 65 or below”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/114-15(d) (West 2004) (indicating that an
IQ score of 75 or below is presumptive evidence of mental retardation); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 532.130(2) (Michie 2003) (defining mental retardation partially by reference to IQ
score); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie 2004) (establishing a presumption of mental
retardation in defendants with IQ scores of 70 or below).
251. See Ellis, supra note 234, at 13 (explaining that the adaptive functioning
requirement ensures that an individual is really impaired as opposed to simply a poor testtaker).
252. See Tobolowsky, supra note 107, at 99 (highlighting that age of onset requires
manifestation of the disability prior to eighteen years of age but does not require a previous
diagnosis).
253. See Ellis, supra note 234, at 13-14 (concluding that malingering is not a practical
problem in the assessment of individuals who have mental retardation); Mossman, supra
note 109, at 276 (“[M]ental retardation is hard to fake successfully, because the criteria
require evidence that retardation began during childhood—evidence . . . that the condition
existed years before the defendant committed a capital crime.”). But see Atkins, 536 U.S. at
353 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (believing that an individual could successfully feign mental
retardation).
254. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308-09 (explaining that psychologists can evaluate mental
retardation by interviewing people familiar with the defendant, reviewing school and court
records, reading statements the defendant made, interviewing the defendant, and
administering a standard intelligence test).
255. See Ellis, supra note 234, at 13 (criticizing the use of IQ scores as the dispositive
factor in legislative definitions of mental retardation); Mossman, supra note 109, at 272
(outlining the differences between legal determinations and medical diagnoses to conclude
that legal distinctions require more information than medical ones); Thomas L. Hafemeister
& John Petrila, Treating the Mentally Disordered Offender: Society’s Uncertain, Conflicted
and Changing Views, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 729, 739-40 (1994) (explaining that the threat
to liberty and the sociological nature of the decision to restrict the rights of mentally
disordered offenders traditionally precluded courts from relying on the determinations of
physicians). But see id. at 749 (observing that courts began restoring the locus of decisionmaking to mental health professionals in the 1980s and 90s); Lockyer & Carey, supra note
81, at 335 (arguing that states should adopt definitions that accurately reflect the judgment
of experts).
256. See 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (plurality opinion) (prohibiting the arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty and requiring cross-jurisdictional uniformity).
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at least communication, the states could adopt varying definitions of mental
retardation that inadequately implement Atkins’ protections and violate
Furman’s mandate.
B. States Should Consider Pretrial Adjudication of the Mental
Retardation Issue to Comprehensively Protect All of a Mentally Retarded
Offender’s Constitutional Rights
On its face, Atkins permits any state procedure that identifies and
excludes mentally retarded offenders from capital punishment.257 The
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments require the state to bear the
burden of proof in this regard by a probable cause or reasonable doubt
standard.258
Including a mental retardation determination in the
guilt/innocence phase of trial as part of the mens rea element of the crime
will allow the jury to consider all mental health evidence at once and may
ease the prosecution’s burden if the defendant raises an insanity defense.259
Alternatively, states could require the prosecution to prove the absence
of mental retardation during the sentencing phase by treating mental
retardation as a capital punishment gateway factor.260 In this context,
mental retardation could simultaneously serve as both an aggravating and a
mitigating factor.261 The defendant’s presentation of mental health
257. 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002).
258. See supra Part II (arguing that the Sixth Amendment requires the jury to determine
the imposition of death penalty, the Eighth Amendment requires the state to prove the
absence of mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt, and the Fourteenth Amendment
requires the prosecution to bear the burden of proof by at least a probable cause standard).
259. See AM. LAW INST., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 4.01 (1985) (“A
person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of
mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.”).
The other common test for insanity, “the M’Naghten test[,] turns on whether the actor by
reason of mental disease or defect did not know the nature or quality of his act or know that
it was wrong . . . .” Id. cmt. 2. Given the American Law Institute’s deferential approach to
“medical understanding,” a finding of mental retardation would satisfy the “mental disease
or defect” prongs of both the American Law Institute and M’Naghten tests. Id. cmt. 4; see
also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206 (1977) (allowing the state to place the
burden of proving insanity as an affirmative defense on the defendant).
260. See Kristen F. Grunewald, Case Note, United States Supreme Court: Atkins v.
Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002), 15 CAP. DEF. J. 117, 123 (2002) (suggesting that a state
could require the prosecution to prove the absence of mental retardation beyond a
reasonable doubt as a threshold issue before proceeding to the sentencing hearing); cf. Ring
v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 603 (2002) (noting that under Arizona’s statutory scheme, the
death penalty would only be imposed after proving the existence of an aggravating factor);
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 138 (1987) (allowing the death penalty of a felony murderer
only after proof that the offender played a major role in the offense and exhibited extreme
indifference to human life); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800-01 (1982) (permitting
courts to impose the death penalty for felony murder only after finding that the defendant
killed or intended to kill).
261. See Huigens, supra note 67, at 1268-69 (emphasizing that mitigating factors are just
the converse of aggravating factors and any distinction between the two is formalistic and
serves no constitutional purpose; both types of factors serve the same purpose of
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evidence would ease the prosecution’s burden of gathering such
information.262 Although proving the absence of mental retardation during
trial or at sentencing would adequately protect a mentally retarded offender
from capital punishment, a pretrial determination of mental retardation may
prove more efficient and avoid the adverse risks of “death qualifying” a
jury.263
A pretrial determination of mental retardation would minimize the cost
of a capital trial for a defendant who is prohibited from receiving the death
penalty.264 More importantly, a pretrial determination would eradicate the
need to “death qualify” a jury, thereby eliminating a time consuming,
costly, and potentially prejudicial

determining the offender’s culpability for sentencing purposes). Even if the prosecution
proved that the offender did not suffer from mental retardation to the extent required by
Atkins, the defense could still argue that the offender’s mental deficiency, albeit minimal,
diminishes culpability enough to warrant life rather than death. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (requiring courts to consider any mitigating evidence that the
defendant presents).
262. See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 444 (1990) (White, J., concurring)
(emphasizing that the U.S. Constitution permits the states to shift the burden of presenting
mitigating evidence during capital sentencing to the defendant).
263. See Ellis, supra note 234, at 13 (addressing the advantages of determining mental
retardation during pretrial proceedings, such as saving the state the cost of an unnecessary
capital trial).
264. See id.; see also STATE OF KANSAS, LEGISLATIVE DIVISION OF POST AUDIT, COSTS
INCURRED FOR DEATH PENALTY CASES: A K-GOAL AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS 11 (Dec. 2003) (finding that death penalty cases cost the state about seventy
percent
more
than
non-death
penalty
cases),
available
at
http://www.kslegislature.org/postaudit/audits_perform/ 04pa03a.pdf; PHILIP J. COOK ET AL.,
THE COST OF PROCESSING MURDER CASES IN NORTH CAROLINA 7 (May 1993) (estimating
that capital cases cost North Carolina $163,000 more than non-capital cases), available at
http://www.pps.aas.duke.edu/people/faculty/cook/ comnc.pdf.
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procedure.265 Following a credible showing of mental retardation,266 a
judge would determine whether the prosecution has probable cause to
believe an offender does not suffer from mental retardation.267 If the state
cannot even meet this burden, then no rational jury could find the absence
of mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt.268 Should the prosecution
prevail at the pretrial hearing, it would still have to prove the absence of
mental retardation to a jury during sentencing.269 This added layer of
protection will help guarantee Atkins’ protections and ensure that no
mentally retarded offender would receive the death penalty.270 Despite its
265. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (forbidding jurors whose views
on capital punishment would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties
as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath” from serving on death penalty
juries) (internal citation omitted). This process, known as death-qualification, developed out
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Witherspoon v. Illinois, where the Court struck down a
state procedure that prohibited all potential jurors who had “conscientious or religious
scruples against capital punishment[,]” or who opposed the death penalty altogether, from
capital jury service. 391 U.S. 510, 520 (1968). In striking down the Illinois law, the
Witherspoon Court emphasized “that a State may not entrust the determination of whether a
man is innocent or guilty to a tribunal organized to convict . . . [or] the determination of
whether a man should live or die to a tribunal organized to return a verdict of death.” Id. at
521 (internal quotations omitted); see also Craig M. Cooley, Forensic Individualization
Sciences and the Capital Jury: Are Witherspoon Jurors More Deferential to Suspect
Science than Non-Witherspoon Jurors?, 28 S. ILL. U. L.J. 273, 280 (2004) (concluding that
death-qualified jurors are more likely to convict and sentence an offender to death than
excludable jurors).
[D]eath-qualified jurors are more concerned with crime control, more likely to assume
the defendant’s guilt before hearing any evidence, less remorseful over wrongful
convictions, more regretful with respect to erroneous acquittals, more impressed with
prosecution witnesses, and more prone to endorse aggravating factors. On the other
hand, excludables are typically due process oriented, more critical of the prosecution,
more judgmental toward their fellow jurors, more receptive to mitigating evidence, and
more likely to endorse non-statutory mitigators.
Id. at 281-82 (internal citations omitted); see also United States v. Green, 343 F. Supp. 2d
23, 35 (D. Mass. 2004) (refusing to impanel a death-qualified jury to determine guilt or
innocence because of the discriminatory effects of conviction-prone death-qualified juries,
and instead agreeing to impanel a second death-qualified jury to determine the appropriate
penalty if the first jury issued a guilty verdict); Jonathan Saltzman, New Juries Must Weigh
Sentence in Capital Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 5, 2004, at A1 (reporting on Judge
Gertner’s decision in Green).
266. Cf. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 452 (1992) (requiring a competence hearing
after the defendant shows credible evidence of incompetence).
267. See id. (noting that once the trial court has expressed a doubt as to the defendant’s
competence, it will hold a hearing); cf. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 694 (1994)
(conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine whether police officers had probable cause
to search a suspect).
268. See Freeman v. Zahradnick, 429 U.S. 1111, 1112 (1977) (forbidding a conviction
where, as a matter of law, no rational jury could find an element of a crime to exist beyond a
reasonable doubt).
269. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (requiring that any fact that
increases the maximum penalty, such as an aggravating factor, be proven to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt). Although a pretrial hearing to determine whether an offender was
mentally retarded would satisfy due process, the Sixth Amendment still requires the state to
prove any fact upon which it conditions punishment. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 476 (2000).
270. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (ruling that executing mentally
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comparative advantages, states are not required to implement a pretrial
determination of mental retardation. As long as the prosecution has the
burden of proving the absence of mental retardation to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt, a state may include this assessment in any phase of a
capital trial.
CONCLUSION
After the Supreme Court left the states with the task of identifying and
excluding mentally retarded offenders from capital punishment,271 every
state that accepted the Court’s challenge required the defendant to bear the
burden of proof by at least a preponderance of the evidence.272 In so doing,
these states failed to consider the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights with which these procedures interfere.
By increasing the maximum penalty an offender can face, the absence of
mental retardation implicates the Sixth Amendment as an element of
capital murder. Only a jury can gauge the community values necessary to
impose the death penalty on a case-by-case basis under the evolving
standards and proportionality prongs of the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and
unusual punishment analysis. Due process guarantees that a defendant has
an opportunity to be heard and requires the prosecution to prove the
absence of mental retardation by at least a probable cause standard.
The Founders of this country trusted only a jury to stand between life
and death at the hands of the state. That principle, reflected in the Sixth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, as vibrant now as
then, requires the state to prove the absence of mental retardation to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt before imposing the death penalty. Until a
majority of the Court accepts Justice Blackmun’s conclusion that “no
combination of procedural rules or substantive regulations can ever save
the death penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies[,]”273 states
must endeavor to impose the death penalty in accordance with the
retarded criminals is a form of excessive punishment prohibited by the Constitution).
271. Id. at 317.
272. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376(b)(3) (West 2004) (placing the burden of proof
by a preponderance of the evidence on the defendant to establish mental retardation); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 11-4209(D)(3)(b) (2003) (placing the burden on the defendant by clear
and convincing evidence); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515A(3) (Michie 2004) (allowing the court to
impose the death penalty only when it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant is not mentally retarded); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/114-15(b) (2004) (placing the
burden of proving the existence of mental retardation on the “moving party”); LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1(C)(1) (West 2004) (placing the burden of proving mental
retardation by a preponderance of the evidence on the defendant); NEV. REV. STAT.
174.098(5)(b) (2004) (declaring that the defendant has the burden of proof of proving
mental retardation); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(C) (Michie 2004) (placing the burden
of proof on the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence).
273. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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